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This paper investigates the role that exchange rate changes can play in rebalancing 
transpacific trade. It presents evidence from a gravity model indicating that the exports from 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the United States (US) are a key outlier in the 
global economy and that imbalances between the PRC and the US have remained large 
during the financial crisis that began in September 2008. It then reports that an appreciation 
of the yuan against the dollar would be required to rebalance bilateral trade between the US 
and the PRC. In the case of multilateral trade between the US and the rest of the world, on 
the other hand, the evidence indicates that a depreciation of the dollar would not 
substantially reduce the US global trade deficit.  In the case of Asia’s exports,  results 
presented here and elsewhere indicate that: (i) sophisticated exports produced within 
regional production networks depend on exchange rates throughout the region; (ii) labor-
intensive exports from developing Asian countries are strongly influenced by each country’s 
own exchange rate; (iii) developing Asian countries compete extensively with each other in 
exports to third markets; (iv) a  currency  appreciation in developing Asia would increase 
capital and consumption goods imports; and (v) exchange rate volatility deters parts and 
components trade in Asia. These findings imply that Asia and the rest of the world would 
benefit if East Asian currencies could appreciate together against external currencies while 
maintaining relative currency stability within the region.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States (US) current account deficit as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) 
grew from 2% in 1997 to 4% in 2002 to 6% before the financial crisis that began in October 
2008. The US ran large trade deficits with East Asia, oil-producing countries, and the rest of 
the world. Since the crisis began, however, America’s deficit with most regions has fallen 
while its deficit with the PRC has remained intransigent. 
Table 1 shows exports, imports, and the trade balance between the US and the rest of the 
world before and after the Lehman Brothers shock in September 2008. Exports and imports 
both exhibited sharp drops beginning in October 2008. The sample is thus divided into the 
year before the crisis erupted (October 2007–September 2008), the first year after the 
Lehman shock (October 2008–September 2009), and forecasts for the second year after the 
Lehman shock (October 2009–September 2010). For non-East Asian countries, the deficit 
fell by 76% during the post-crisis period, equaling US$227 billion between October 2008 and 
September 2009. For the PRC, it fell by less than 12% and equaled $237 billion in the same 
period. Columns (7) through (9) indicate that this pattern is continuing during the second 
year after the crisis. The US deficit with the PRC since October 2008 roughly equals the US 
deficit with all non-East Asian countries together. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Table 1: Exports, Imports, and Trade Balance between the US and Other Countries and Regions before and after the Lehman 
Brothers Shock (billions of US dollars) 
Notes: The year before the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2007 to September 2008. The first year after the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2008 to September 2009. 
The second year after the Lehman Brothers shock is from October 2009 to September 2010. The forecast for the second year is derived by multiplying data for the five months for which 
data is available (i.e., October 2009–February 2010) by 2.4. 
Source: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/.
  Year before Lehman Brothers Shock  First Year after Lehman Brothers Shock  Second Year after Lehman Brothers Shock (forecast) 
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Figures 1 and 2 highlight the unusual nature of the PRC’s exports to the US.  Figure 1 
presents predicted and actual multilateral exports and imports for the 31 largest exporting 
countries in 2007, just before the crisis. The results were obtained from a gravity model 
described in Appendix 1. Figure 2 presents data from 2007 on predicted and actual exports 
of the PRC to 31 countries and predicted and actual imports of the US from 31 countries. 
The figures indicate that PRC exports, US imports, and especially PRC exports to the US 
are clear outliers in the global economy. 
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AUS = Australia; AUT = Austria; BRZ = Brazil; CAN = Canada; DNK = Denmark; ESP = Spain; FRA = France; FIN = 
Finland; GER = Germany; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; IRL = Ireland; ITA = Italy; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of 
Korea; KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; MEX = Mexico; MYS = Malaysia; NLD = Netherlands; NOR = Norway; PHL ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
 
  4 
= Philippines; POL = Poland; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SGP = Singapore; SWE = Sweden; SWZ = 
Switzerland; TAI = Taipei,China; THA = Thailand; TUR = Turkey; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States. 
Note: Predicted exports or imports represent the sum of predicted exports or predicted imports from 31 countries 
based on a gravity model. The gravity model includes income in the exporting and importing countries, the real 
exchange rate, distance, a common language dummy, importer and exporter fixed effects, dummy variables for 
Mexico and Canada, and a time trend as explanatory variables.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.. 
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AUS = Australia; AUT = Austria; BRZ = Brazil; CAN = Canada; DNK = Denmark; ESP = Spain; FRA = France; FIN = 
Finland; GER = Germany; IDN = Indonesia; IND = India; IRL = Ireland; ITA = Italy; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of 
Korea; KSA = Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; MEX = Mexico; MYS = Malaysia; NLD = Netherlands; NOR = Norway; PHL 
= Philippines; POL = Poland; PRC = People’s Republic of China; SGP = Singapore; SWE = Sweden; SWZ = 
Switzerland; TAI = Taipei,China; THA = Thailand; TUR = Turkey; UK = United Kingdom; US = United States. 
Note: Predicted exports or imports represent the sum of predicted exports or predicted imports from 31 countries 
based on a gravity model. The gravity model includes income in the exporting and importing countries, the real 
exchange rate, distance, a common language dummy, importer and exporter fixed effects, dummy variables for 
Mexico and Canada, and a time trend as explanatory variables.  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
Given the distinctness  of these imbalances, this paper begins by examining the factors 
affecting PRC exports to the US. The findings indicate that a 10% appreciation of the yuan 
would cause the PRC’s exports to fall by 10% or maybe a little more. On the other hand, the 
results indicate that a decrease in income in the US would not cause a large drop in the 
PRC’s exports. This evidence is supported by recent experience. During the 2008–2009 
crisis, the yuan  remained tightly pegged to the dollar.  As Table 1 shows, a once-in-a-
generation crisis barely reduced the PRC’s exports to the US. If policymakers want to reduce 
imbalances between the PRC and the US, a real appreciation of the yuan is thus probably 
necessary.
1
This paper then presents aggregate import and export elasticities for the US  and Asian 
countries that were estimated using a consistent methodology.  Results from a dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS) model indicate that trade elasticities for aggregate US 
exports and imports are small. Thus exchange rate changes alone may not be sufficient to 
significantly reduce America’s global trade deficit. 
 
                                                 
1 A  real appreciation could be accomplished by either an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate or an 
increase in the price level. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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These estimates, though, are subject to the aggregation bias first discussed by Orcutt 
(1950). They can also be distorted by the nature of Asian trade. For example, many of the 
imports into Asian countries are parts and components that are used to produce goods for 
re-export to the rest of the world. An exchange rate appreciation that reduces a country’s 
exports can also reduce its demand for imported goods that are used to produce exports. 
This can cause the estimated exchange rate coefficient in import equations to be biased 
toward zero (see Kamada and Takagawa 2005). 
This paper thus supplements the aggregate estimates of exchange rate elasticities with a 
review of previously published results. The evidence indicates that: (i) a depreciation of the 
dollar alone may not be sufficient to substantially reduce America’s global current account 
deficit; (ii) sophisticated exports produced within regional production networks depend on 
exchange rates throughout the region; (iii)  labor-intensive exports from developing Asian 
countries are strongly influenced by each country’s own exchange rate; (iv) developing Asian 
countries compete extensively with each other in exports to third markets; (v) a currency 
appreciation in developing Asia would increase capital and consumption goods imports; and 
(vi) exchange rate volatility deters parts and components trade in Asia. 
Two policy implications flow from these findings. First, if the US current account deficit needs 
to be reduced in the future, absorption-reducing policies such as fiscal consolidation would 
probably be required. The expenditure-switching effect of a dollar depreciation may not be 
large enough to significantly reduce America’s trade deficit. Second, a joint appreciation 
throughout East Asia would be beneficial for the region and the world.  It would help to 
maintain exchange rate stability within the region, facilitating the flow of capital goods and 
parts and components among Asian countries. It would increase the purchasing power of 
consumers in the PRC and other countries. It also would help reduce Asia’s over-reliance on 
exports to the US and Europe. Finally, it would help overcome prisoner’s dilemma problems 
that arise because the fear of losing competitiveness relative to Asian trading partners 
sometimes prevents countries in the region from allowing their currencies to appreciate.  
One way for East Asian countries to appreciate together would be for the PRC to adopt a 
regime characterized by a multiple-currency, basket-based reference rate with a reasonably 
wide band.  In this case, the huge surpluses generated within East Asian production 
networks would cause currencies in the region to appreciate together. Market forces could 
then allocate these appreciations across supply chain countries as a function of the size of 
their surpluses in processing trade. 
The next section investigates the factors affecting the PRC’s exports to the US. Section 3 
reports export and import elasticities for the US  and selected Asian countries estimated 
using a consistent methodology. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  NEW EVIDENCE FOR THE PRC’S EXPORTS TO THE US 
2.1  Background 
Table 1 shows that the PRC’s exports to the US exceed the PRC’s imports from the US by a 
five-to-one ratio. Figure 3 shows that the PRC’s exports to the US (but not US exports to the 
PRC) represent a major outlier for both countries. This section thus investigates the factors 
affecting the PRC’s exports to the US ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Figure 3: Detrended, Deseasonalized Exports from Japan; Republic of Korea; and 



































































































































































JAPAN KOREA, REP. OF TAIPEI,CHINA DETRENDED US GDP
 
GDP = gross domestic product, US = United States. 
Note: Y-axis on the right side is for detrended US GDP; y-axis on the left side is for Japan; Republic of Korea; and 
Taipei,China’s detrended and deseasonalized exports. 
Sources: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/; and authors’ calculations. 
As Wakasugi (2009) argued, there is a fundamental difference between exports from Japan 
to the US and exports from the PRC to the US. Exports from Japan tend to be high-end, 
knowledge-intensive goods. Exports from the PRC tend to be more labor-intensive, given the 
abundance of unskilled labor in the PRC.  METI (2009) similarly reported  that Japan’s 
exports to the US are dominated by high value-added consumer durables while the PRC’s 
exports are dominated by basic goods such as clothing. The Republic of Korea (hereafter 
Korea) and Taipei,China’s exports to the US are also dominated by high value-added goods 
such as passenger cars, household appliances, semiconductors, and computers. 
Wakasugi (2009) and METI (2009) noted that since the PRC exports primarily basic goods 
to the US while Japan and the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) export primarily high-
end luxury products, the income elasticity of demand for exports from the PRC to the US 
should be smaller than for exports from more advanced Asian economies to the US. Petri 
and Plummer (2009) similarly discussed how the product mix of PRC goods may lead to 
what they call the “Walmart” effect. By this they mean that “if Chinese exports are at low 
price points within various product categories, they will benefit from a down-market shift in 
the composition of consumption even if demand for the category as a whole declines” (Petri 
and Plummer 2009:  705). In other words, the product composition and low price of the 
PRC’s exports may sustain demand even when income in the US falls. 
Informal evidence from Figures 3 and 4 supports the hypothesis that the PRC’s exports 
respond less to changes in US income than exports from developed Asia do. Both figures 
show detrended quarterly output in the US. Figure 3 also shows detrended, deseasonalized 
real exports from Japan;  Korea;  and Taipei,China to the US  and Figure 4 also shows 
detrended, deseasonalized real exports from the PRC  to the US.  The large increase in ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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detrended output up until the second quarter of 2000 and its subsequent large fall are 
associated with the dot-com bubble in the US  and its bursting.  Figure 3 shows that 
detrended, deseasonalized exports from developed Asia mirrored the pattern of US output at 
this time.  On the other hand, Figure 4 shows a more tenuous relationship between US 
income over this period and PRC exports to the US.
2





































































































































































PRC DETRENDED US GDP
 
GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Note: Y-axis on the right side is for detrended US GDP; y-axis on the left side is for the PRC’s detrended and 
deseasonalized exports 
Sources: US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/; and authors’ calculations. 
Several authors have presented formal evidence indicating that income elasticities are 
higher for exports from Japan; Korea; and Taipei,China to the US than for exports from the 
PRC to the US. Thorbecke (2008a), using a variety of cointegration estimators and quarterly 
data over the 1988–2005 period, reported that the income elasticity of demand for Japan’s 
exports to the US was approximately 3. Kim (2009), using a Johansen cointegration model 
and quarterly data over the 1981–1998 period, reported that the income elasticity for Korea’s 
exports to the US was 3.5. Chen (2001), using ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques and 
quarterly data over the 1981–1998 period, reported that income elasticity for Taipei,China’s 
exports to the US was 2.6. In contrast, both Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) using DOLS 
methods and quarterly data over the 1993–2006 period and Thorbecke (2006) using DOLS 
and Johansen maximum likelihood estimation and quarterly data over the 1988–2005 period 
failed to find evidence that an increase in income in the US  would increase the PRC’s 
exports. 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), Thorbecke (2006), and Yu (2009) all reported that a 
depreciation of the yuan is associated with an increase in the PRC’s exports to the US. 
Cheung,  Chinn, and Fujii reported exchange rate elasticities ranging from 0.80 to 2.03, 
                                                 
2 Figure 2 shows aggregate PRC  exports.  Some categories of PRC  exports are more sensitive to income. 
Thorbecke and Smith (2010) reported that that sophisticated processed exports from PRC to the world have 
higher income elasticity than less sophisticated ordinary exports. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Thorbecke reported elasticities ranging from 0.40 to 1.44, and Yu reported an exchange rate 
elasticity of 1.23. 
This section reports updated findings for the PRC’s exports to the US. Results from DOLS 
estimation indicate that an appreciation of the yuan relative to the dollar would reduce the 
PRC’s exports to the US.  On the other hand, the econometric results do not provide 
convincing evidence of a strong relationship between US income and the PRC’s aggregate 
exports. 
2.2  Data and Methodology 
The imperfect substitutes model of Goldstein and Khan (1985) implies that export functions 
can be written as:  
t ex  = α10 + α11 t rer    + α12 * t rgdp  + εt,  (1) 
where  t ex  represents the log of real exports, t rer    represents the log of the real exchange 
rate, and  * rgdp  represents the log of foreign real income. 
Monthly data on exports from the PRC to the US are available from the US Census Bureau. 
These data were summed to obtain quarterly values. 
To deflate the PRC’s exports to the US we used the US Bureau of Labor Statistics price 
deflator for manufactured imports from non-industrial countries. Chinn (2006) found that this 
series closely matches the  Bureau of Labor Statistics price deflator for imports from the 
PRC, which became available in 2003. 
Data for quarterly real GDP for the US were obtained from Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development trade statistics. These data were seasonally adjusted. 
The real exchange rate was calculated as the product of the yuan price of dollars and the 
ratio of the US to the PRC price levels. An increase in real exchange rate thus represents a 
depreciation of the yuan. In one specification, we followed Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010) 
in using exchange rates before 1994 that are adjusted for the fact that some transactions 
took place at the official exchange rate and some took place at the “swap” rate. 
Thorbecke (2006) argued that the PRC’s exports to the US  compete with exports from 
emerging Asia. Ahearne et al. (2003) presented evidence that economies in Asia follow a 
“flying geese” pattern, with the PRC and Association of Southeast Asian Nations-4 (ASEAN-
4) moving into product categories relinquished by the Asian NIEs as they move up the value 
chain.
3
A real exchange rate index (It) between the  US and the ASEAN-4 countries (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) can be calculated using the following formula: 
 Similarly, Gaulier, Lemoine, and Unal-Kesenci (2005) reported based on a detailed 
analysis of trade flow data that there is essentially a complimentary relationship between the 
PRC and the NIEs. On the other hand, they found that there is a competitive relationship 
between the PRC and ASEAN in the export of labor-intensive final goods to third countries. 
Thus, in empirical work, it is important to control for competition between exports from the 










t i t i t t
t i r r I I  
where ri,t is the real exchange rate between ASEAN country i and the US in quarter t and wi,t 
is the weight assigned to ASEAN country i in quarter t. ri,t equals the currency price of dollars 
times the ratio of the US price level to the price level of country i. An increase in ri,t (and thus 
                                                 
3  They defined  the NIEs as Korea;  Singapore;  and  Taipei,China  and ASEAN-4  as Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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It) represents an appreciation of the dollar. wi,t is calculated as the ratio of exports from 
country i to the US divided by exports from all four ASEAN countries to the US. The sum of 
the wi,t thus equals 1. It is set equal to 100 in 1985Q1.  
Following Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2010), we also included the capital stock to control for 
supply side factors. For the PRC, Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) have constructed data on the 
capital stock. These data were converted to quarterly values using linear interpolation and 
updated over the last few years using data from the Economist Intelligence Unit database. 
The model was estimated using DOLS. DOLS involves regressing the left-side variable on a 
constant, the right-side variables, and lags and leads of the right-side variables.  The 
equation has the form: 
) 3 ( , , , , ,




j t j eri
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p j
j t j K
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p j
j t i j rgdp
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p j
j t j rer t t t t t
u eri K rgdp
rer Time eri K rgdp rer x
+ ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +












α β β β β β β
where  t x  represents exports from the Asian country to the US,  t rer    represents the bilateral 
real exchange rate index,  t rgdp  equals real income in the US,  t K  denotes the capital stock 
in the Asian country, eri represents the exchange rate index for other Asian countries, and 
Time is a time trend. Seasonal dummy variables are also included.  t x ,  t rer   ,  t rgdp ,  t K , 
and  t eri  are measured in natural logs.  
Data on the import price indices are available beginning in 1990Q4 and data on the 
consumer price index are available until 2008Q4. We estimated equation (4) using a DOLS 
(2, 2) model.
4
2.3  Results 
 Because this involves using two leads and lags of the first differences of the 
right-side variables, the actual sample period for the estimation is 1990Q4–2008Q2. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the results. Table 2 contains the findings for the bilateral exchange 
rate adjusted for swap transactions and Table 3 contains the findings for the unadjusted 
bilateral exchange rate.  
                                                 
4 A DOLS (2, 2) model employs two leads and two lags of the first differences of the right-side variables. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Table 2: DOLS Estimates of the PRC’s Exports to the US, 1990–2008 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
DOLS = dynamic ordinary least squares, GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People’s Republic of China, RER = real exchange rate, US = United States. 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Independent 
variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
US GDP  0.36  0.80  –0.16  –1.00  1.24*  6.00***  0.65  5.42*** 
  (0.85)  (0.96)  (0.76)  (0.79)  (0.73)  (0.12)  (0.48)  (0.07) 
PRC Weighted RER 
relative to the dollar 
0.95***  1.58***  0.50**  1.52***  0.66***  0.82***  0.52***  0.78*** 
  (0.33)  (0.14)  (0.23)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.09)  (0.15) 
PRC capital stock  0.43  1.42***  –0.07  1.82***         





–0.19  –0.39***      –0.13  –0.61***     
  (0.14)  (0.11)      (0.11)  (0.11)     
Time  0.03**    0.05***    0.04***    –0.04***   
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Adjusted R-squared  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
No. of observations  68  68  68  68  68  68  68  68 ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Table 3: DOLS Estimates of the PRC’s Exports to the US, 1990–2008 
*** and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
DOLS = dynamic ordinary least squares, GDP = gross domestic product, PRC = People’s Republic of China, RER = real exchange rate, US = United States. 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. 
Independent 
variables 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
US GDP  0.76  2.48*  0.68  0.18  0.41  5.85***  –0.24  5.39*** 
  (0.82)  (1.45)  (0.61)  (1.36)  (0.71)  (0.11)  (0.36)  (0.08) 
PRC RER relative to 
the dollar 
0.52**  1.45***  0.20  1.20***  0.71***  0.78***  0.57***  0.55*** 
  (0.25)  (0.28)  (0.15)  (0.27)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.08)  (0.21) 
PRC capital stock  –0.44  0.92  –0.68**  1.45***         





–0.10  –0.48**      –0.08  –0.61***     
  (0.16)  (0.20)      (0.10)  (0.10)     
Time  0.05***    0.06***    0.04***    –0.04***   
  (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.00)    (0.00)   
Adjusted R-squared  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.98 
No. of observations  68  68  74  74  68  68  74  74 ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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Thorbecke and Smith (2010) argued that the preferred specification for the PRC should 
include the capital stock and exclude the time trend. In this specification the coefficient 
on the yuan exchange rate in Tables 2 and 3 is statistically significant and equals about 
1.5. These results imply that a 10% appreciation of the yuan would reduce the PRC’s 
exports to the US by about 15%. The coefficients on US income and the PRC capital 
stock are positive, but in one case only the coefficient on US  income is statistically 
significant and in the other case only the coefficient on the capital stock is statistically 
significant. These conflicting results probably occur because both the PRC capital stock 
and  US income resemble deterministic trends. Finally, the coefficient on the ASEAN 
exchange rate index is negative and significant.  The results indicate that a 10% 
appreciation of ASEAN countries would increase the PRC’s exports by 4% to 5%. 
Across the 16 different specifications in Tables 2 and 3, the coefficient on the yuan 
exchange rate is positive in every case and statistically significant in 15 of the 16 cases. 
These results provide robust evidence that an appreciation of the yuan would reduce 
PRC  exports to  the  US.  The average value across all of the specifications is 
approximately unity. For income and the PRC capital stock, the coefficient values are 
sensitive to the econometric specification. 
The evidence of a tenuous relationship between aggregate PRC exports and US income 
is supported by experience during 2008–2009. The yuan remained tightly pegged to the 
dollar, and a once-in-a-generation crisis barely reduced the PRC’s exports to the US and 
its trade surplus. If policymakers want to reduce imbalances between the US and the 
PRC, an appreciation of the yuan is probably necessary. 
3.  ESTIMATING ELASTICITIES OF EXPORTS AND 
IMPORTS FOR TRANSPACIFIC COUNTRIES 
3.1  Data and Methodology 
This section presents estimates of aggregate trade elasticities estimated using a 
consistent methodology. Estimates are presented for the US and for PRC; Japan; Korea; 
Malaysia; Philippines; Thailand; and Taipei,China. For India and Indonesia, data were 
not available over a long enough time period to estimate the model using the same 
methodology. 
Equation (1) presented export functions based on the imperfect substitutes model. 
Import functions based on the imperfect substitutes model can be written as:  
t im  = α10 + α11 t rer    + α12 t rgdp  + εt,  (4) 
where  t im  represents the log of real imports, t rer    represents the log of the real 
exchange rate, and  t rgdp  represents the log of domestic real income. 
Quarterly data on aggregate exports and imports are available from the International 
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). For most countries these data 
are measured in dollars and were deflated using the US producer price index from IFS. 
For Japan they are measured in yen and are deflated using Japanese export and import 
prices from IFS. For the US they are measured in dollars and are deflated using US 
export and import prices from IFS. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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To calculate rest of the  world income for each exporting country we constructed  a 
weighted index of income changes in the top 10 export destinations. The index was 










t i t i t t
t i rgdp rgdp rgdp rgdp  
where  * t rgdp  is rest of the world income for an exporting country, the subscript i 
indexes the 10 largest export markets,  i rgdp is income in country i, and wi is the share of 
exports going to country i relative to exports going to the 10 largest export markets. The 
weights  were  calculated using annual data from the CEPII-Chelem database  and 
converted to quarterly data using linear interpolation. The index was set equal to 100 in 
1981Q1. 
Data on real income and the real effective exchange rate were obtained from various 
sources. These are discussed in the Appendix 2. 
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where the variables are defined above.  
For most countries we used data from 1981Q1 to 2008Q3. We estimated Equation (6) 
using a DOLS (2, 2) model. Because this involves using two leads and lags of the first 
differences of the right-side variables, the actual sample period for the estimation is 
1981Q4–2008Q1. In the case of PRC, Philippines, and Thailand we could only obtain 
consistent data over the 1990Q1–2008Q3 period and the actual sample period for the 
estimation is thus 1990Q4–2008Q1. 
3.2  Results and Discussion 
Table 4 presents the results. Income coefficients for every country are positive and 
statistically significant.  These results indicate that for each country an increase in 
domestic income would increase imports and an increase in rest of the world income 
would increase exports. 
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Exports         Imports 
Japan 
Exports         Imports  
Rep. of Korea 
Exports         Imports 
Taipei,China 
Exports         Imports  
Income of 
trade partners  1.76***  2.14***  1.11***  2.31***  1.94***  1.32***  1.75***  1.45*** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
RER   –0.35***  0.28***  –0.32***  –0.34***  –0.21*  1.08***  1.12***  0.92*** 
  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.20)  (0.12) 
Adjusted R-

























Exports         Imports 
Malaysia 
Exports         Imports 
Philippines 
Exports         Imports  
Thailand 
Exports         Imports 
Income of 
trade partners  5.51***  1.74***  2.20***  1.57***  2.64***  1.62***  1.98***  1.54*** 
  (0.14)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.03)  (0.08) 
RER   –1.20***  –1.09***  0.59***  0.45**  0.44**  1.11***  0.78***  0.52*** 
  (0.25)  (0.26)  (0.14)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.14) 
Adjusted R-




















observations  73  70  106  106  70  70  70  70 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
DOLS = dynamic ordinary least squares, PRC = People’s Republic of China, RER = real exchange rate. 
Notes: DOLS (2, 2) estimates. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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There is evidence of an asymmetry between the income elasticities for imports and exports. 
For the US, the income elasticity of imports is greater than the income elasticity of exports. 
On the other hand, for all the East Asian countries except Japan, the income elasticity of 
imports is less than the income elasticity of exports. 
The exchange rate elasticities take on the unexpected  signs in many cases for Asian 
countries but take on the expected signs and are statistically significant for the US. For Asian 
countries, the exchange rate estimates may be distorted because of the nature of East Asian 
production networks (see, e.g., Kamada and Takagawa 2005).  For the US, the results 
indicate that a 10% appreciation of the dollar would reduce exports by about 4% and 
increase imports by about 3%.  
There are a few problems with the aggregate estimates reported in Table 4. One, already 
mentioned, is that these estimates can be distorted by the nature of processing trade within 
Asia. For example, many of the imports into Asian countries are parts and components that 
are used to assemble goods for re-export to the rest of the world.  An exchange rate 
appreciation in the assembly country that reduces exports will also reduce the demand for 
imported goods that are used to produce the exports. This can cause estimated exchange 
rate coefficients in import equations to be biased toward zero. A second problem, noted long 
ago by Orcutt (1950), is that estimates of aggregate trade elasticities may be biased if 
elasticities differ by sector. A third problem, emphasized by Kenen (2007), is that it may be 
necessary to disaggregate trade flows by country or by group of countries to avoid biased 
results. A fourth problem is that employing the same specification for all countries does not 
take into account country-specific characteristics. 
It is thus useful to review other evidence concerning how exchange rate changes affect 
exports and imports. Below we discuss additional evidence for both the US and for Asian 
countries. 
Chinn (2004, 2005a, 2005b) and others, in a series of valuable studies using cointegration 
techniques, uncovered several stylized facts concerning US trade elasticities: 
(i) Exchange rate elasticities for US exports in real terms are precisely estimated and range 
from 0.68 to 0.84. 
(ii)  Exchange rate elasticities for US  imports in real terms are not statistically significant 
unless computers and oil are excluded. These amount to 15% of total imports. If they are 
excluded, price elasticities for the remaining 85% of imports are statistically significant but 
low. They range from 0.29 to 0.49. 
(iii) The sum of the export and import elasticities just barely exceeds one (1.15 if we use the 
midpoints), implying that the Marshall-Lerner  condition  for a depreciation to improve the 
trade balance in nominal terms is just barely met. 
(iv) The income elasticity of demand for US exports is between 1.7 and 2.0. 
(v) The income elasticity of demand for US imports is 2.4. 
(vi) The Houthakker-Magee effect (i.e., the finding that income elasticities for US imports 
substantially exceed income elasticities for US exports) is still present in the estimates. The 
difference in the income elasticities, however, appears to have fallen since Houthakker and 
Magee’s original work in 1969.
5
Chinn concluded  based on these estimates that a depreciation of the dollar, if not 
accompanied by a decrease in expenditures in the US or an increase in expenditures in the 
rest of the world, would be unlikely to substantially reduce the US trade deficit. 
 
                                                 
5  Bosworth and Collins (2010), on the other hand, found that the Houthakker-Magee asymmetry has 
disappeared, with income elasticity of demand for US exports of 2.7 and income elasticity of demand for US 
imports of 2.4. They also found larger exchange rate coefficients than those reported by Chinn (2005a, 2005b). ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
 
17 
For Asian countries it has been useful to disaggregate imports and exports by category. 
Some of the key import categories are parts and components, capital goods, and 
consumption goods. Some of the key export categories are labor-intensive manufacturing 
goods and technologically-sophisticated goods. 
Parts and components trade within East Asia has exploded along with the growth of regional 
production and distribution networks.  IMF (2005) noted  that the flow of imports for 
processing is driven by the demand for final exports in the rest of the world. It estimated that 
the exchange rate elasticity for imports for processing in Asian processor economies is small 
(about 0.1). 
While the level of the exchange rate may not matter much for parts and components trade 
within East Asian production networks, both theoretical and empirical evidence indicates that 
exchange rate volatility matters a lot. Theoretically this effect arises because the service link 
cost for production blocks separated by national borders is an increasing function of risk and 
uncertainty, and exchange rate volatility increases risk and uncertainty. Empirically, using 
panel DOLS techniques over the 1985–2005 period, Thorbecke (2008b) reported that a one 
standard deviation increase in the coefficient of variation of the exchange rate between two 
Asian countries would reduce electronic components imports on average by US$300 million 
per year. Similarly, estimating a gravity model over the 1992–2005 period, Hayakawa and 
Kimura (2009) found that exchange rate volatility as measured by the standard deviation of 
the rate of change of the exchange rate decreased parts and components trade in Asia more 
than tariff barriers did.  Ito et al. (2008), surveying Japanese multinational  corporations, 
reported that exchange rate stability between Asian countries is essential for the 
uninterrupted flow of parts and components within regional production networks. 
In capital goods trade there  is essentially a complimentary relationship between firms in 
Japan; Korea; and Taipei,China and firms in developing Asia. Sophisticated capital goods 
are produced in developed Asia and exported to developing Asia, and many of these goods 
are difficult to procure elsewhere. Thorbecke (2008a, 2009a), using  a gravity model and 
annual data over the 1982–2003 period, found that an appreciation in developed Asia 
relative to developing Asia would cause a large drop in capital goods trade. This would harm 
firms in developed Asia by reducing their exports and also harm firms in developing Asia by 
making it harder to purchase vital inputs that are difficult to procure elsewhere. 
Consumption imports also have the potential to play an important role in Asia. In the PRC, 
for instance, the lion’s share of imports represent inputs into the production process and 
consumption imports accounted for only 8% of the total in 2007.
6
Two key export categories within Asia are final electronics goods such as consumer 
electronics goods and computer equipment and labor-intensive manufactures such as 
clothing, furniture, and footwear. Final electronics goods are produced largely within East 
Asian production and distribution networks.  Japan;  Korea;  and Taipei,China produce 
sophisticated technology-intensive intermediate goods and ship them to the PRC  and 
ASEAN for assembly and re-export.  Value-added in the assembly countries is typically 
small.
 An increase in 
consumption goods exports would benefit PRC  consumers.  Thorbecke (2009b), using a 
panel DOLS model and annual data over the 1985–2006  period, reported that a 10% 
appreciation of the yuan would increase the PRC’s consumption imports from the rest of the 
world by 13%. 
7  Labor-intensive manufactures, on the other hand, are typically produced in 
developing Asia largely using domestic inputs.
8
                                                 
6 In the US, by contrast, consumption goods imports were 25% of total imports in 2007. The source of these 
statistics is the CEPII-Chelem database. 
  
7 According to Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008), PRC value-added in these sectors is small relative to the costs 
of the intermediate goods imported from abroad.  For instance, they reported that PRC  value-added in ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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For final electronics  goods, the evidence indicates that exchange rates in the countries 
producing parts and components are an important determinant of exports from developing 
Asia.  For instance Ahmed (2009) and Thorbecke and Smith (2010) found that an 
appreciation in East Asian supply chain countries would cause a large drop in processed 
exports. Thorbecke (2009c) reported similar results for the East Asian computer industry.
9
For labor-intensive manufacturing goods, Thorbecke  (2009d) and Thorbecke and Zhang 
(2009) found that an appreciation in the developing Asian country exporting the goods would 
cause a large drop in exports. The results indicate that there is also substantial competition 
between different countries in Asia that export labor-intensive goods to third markets. Similar 
results, reported in Section 2, indicate that a depreciation in ASEAN countries would cause a 
large drop in the PRC’s exports to the US. 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has considered the role that exchange rate changes can play in  transpacific 
rebalancing. It first documented that PRC exports to the US were a major outlier in the global 
economy before the financial crisis that began in October 2008 and that imbalances between 
the PRC and the US have barely fallen since the crisis began. Evidence presented here 
indicates that an appreciation of the yuan relative to the dollar would be necessary to reduce 
these imbalances. 
At the global level, however, a depreciation of the dollar may not rebalance America’s trade. 
Multilateral trade elasticities reported here and also those reported by Chinn (2005a, 2005b) 
indicate that a depreciation of the dollar would not substantially reduce the aggregate US 
trade deficit. Thus, if the current account deficit remains a problem for the US going forward, 
absorption-reducing policies such as fiscal consolidation would probably be required. 
This paper has also reviewed evidence concerning how exchange rates affect Asian exports 
and imports. The evidence indicates that: (i) sophisticated exports produced within regional 
production networks depend on exchange rates throughout the region; (ii) labor-intensive 
exports from developing Asian countries are strongly influenced by each country’s own 
exchange rate; (iii) developing Asian countries compete extensively with each other in 
exports to third markets; (iv) an appreciation in developing Asia would increase capital and 
consumption goods imports; and (v) exchange rate volatility deters parts and components 
trade in Asia. 
These findings imply that Asia and the rest of the world would benefit if East Asian 
currencies could appreciate together against external currencies while maintaining relative 
currency stability within the region. Since ordinary exports tend to be simple, labor-intensive 
goods while processed exports are sophisticated, capital-intensive goods, a generalized 
appreciation in East Asia would generate more expenditure-switching toward goods 
produced outside the region and contribute more to resolving global imbalances than an 
appreciation of the  yuan  or of other Asian currencies alone.  In addition, exchange rate 
stability in Asia would facilitate the flow of parts and components and provide a stable 
backdrop for regional production and distribution networks.  Further, it would prevent 
unpleasant  outcomes such as beggar-thy-neighbor policies that arise because Asian 
economies not only cooperate within production networks but also compete in third markets. 
                                                                                                                                                  
electronic computers was less than 5% in 2002 and that PRC value-added in telecommunications equipment 
was less than 15%. 
8 Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2008) reported that PRC value-added in these industries is approximately 70%. 
9 In recent years more of the assembly operations have migrated to the PRC. As more of the value-added is 
produced in PRC, an appreciation of the yuan should have a larger effect on processed exports. 
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One way for Asian countries involved in processing trade to appreciate together would be for 
the PRC to adopt a regime characterized by a multiple-currency, basket-based reference 
rate with a reasonably wide band. In this case, the huge surpluses generated within East 
Asian production networks would cause currencies in the region to appreciate together. 
Market forces could then allocate these appreciations across supply chain countries as a 
function of the size of their surpluses in processing trade.  
Concerted appreciations in East Asia would give firms in the region an incentive to redirect 
production away from export markets toward domestic markets. This would not only lead to 
a more sustainable long-term equilibrium by reducing Asia’s dependence on Western 
consumers but would also allow workers in the region to enjoy more of the fruits of their own 
labor. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
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APPENDIX 1: GRAVITY MODEL USED TO CONSTRUCT 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 
Predicted exports and imports in Figures 1 and 2 were derived from a gravity model. Gravity 
models posit that bilateral trade between two countries is directly proportional to gross 
domestic product (GDP)  in the two countries and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them. In addition to GDP and distance, these models typically include other factors 
affecting bilateral trade such as whether trading partners share a common language.
10
The baseline model has the form: 
1 
Leamer and Levinsohn (1995: 1384) stated that gravity models yield “some of the clearest 
and most robust findings in economics.” 
lnExijt = β0 + β1lnYit + β2lnYjt + β3lnDISTij + β4Lang + β5lnRERijt  +  
β6USCAN + β6USMEX + β7TIME + ∂i + Ωj + πt + εijt,  (A1) 
where Exijt  represents exports from country i to country j, t represents time, Yit  and Yjt 
represent real GDP in countries i and j, DISTij represents the geodesic distance between 
countries i and j, LANGij is a dummy variable equaling 1 if countries i and j share a common 
language and 0 otherwise, RERijt is the bilateral real exchange rate between country i and 
country j, USCAN and USMEX are dummy variables equaling 1 for trade between the United 
States (US)  and Canada or the US  and Mexico and zero otherwise, and  ∂ i  and Ωj  are 
country i and country j fixed effects. The gravity model  was estimated as a panel using 
annual data for 31 countries over the 1988–2007 sample period. The model performs well. 





                                                 
10 Data sources are presented in Appendix 2. 
11 Detailed results are available on request. ADBI Working Paper 247    Thorbecke and Komoto 
 
21 
APPENDIX 2: DATA SOURCES 
The data were obtained from various sources: 
I. Gravity Model for 31 leading countries in 2007  
1.  Trade data for the 31 countries were obtained from the CEPII-Chelem database.  
2.  Real exchange rates also came from the CEPII-Chelem database. 
3.  Data on the consumer price index came from the International Monetary Fund’s 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
4.  Data on real gross domestic product (GDP), geodesic distance, and common 
language were obtained from the CEPII website (www.cepii.fr). 
II. PRC’s Exports to the United States (US) 
1.  Data on exports of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the US were obtained from the US Census 
Bureau. 
2.  Quarterly data on import price indices from 1990Q4–2008Q were obtained from 
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. US producer price index and US consumer 
price index were obtained from the CEIC database. 
3.  Data on quarterly real GDP for the US were obtained from Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) trade statistics. 
4.  Data on nominal exchange rates and consumer prices index were obtained from 
IFS.  
5.  Capital stock data were obtained from the University of Pennsylvania Center for 
International Comparison, Economist Intelligence Unit, and Cheung, Chinn, and 
Fujii (2010). 
III. Export and Import Elasticities for Asian Countries and the US 
1.  Quarterly export and import data were obtained from IFS. 
2.  Data on nominal exchange rates, the consumer price index, the producer price 
index, import prices, and export prices were obtained from IFS.  
3.  Quarterly GDP data for the PRC, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand 
were obtained from Rajaguru and Abeysinghe (2004)
12
4.  Real effective exchange rates were obtained from different sources: for India; 
Indonesia; Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China, data came from the Bank for 
International Settlements; for PRC, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, and US, data 
came from IFS; and for Thailand, data came from the Central Bank of Thailand. 
; quarterly GDP data for 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Mexico, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and US were obtained from the OECD; 
and quarterly GDP data for India were obtained from the CEIC database. 
5.  Data on the top 10 export destinations for countries in the sample were obtained 
from the CEPII-Chelem database. 
                                                 
12 Updated data are available at http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/ecstabey/gdpdata.xls. Following the authors’ 
recommendation, these data were seasonally adjusted before being included in the model and were extended 
for the last couple of years using real GDP growth rates available from the Economist Intelligence Unit country 
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